




Good capital? Examples of successful municipal bond banking and implications for 
Australian public policy 
Abstract: The putative benefits of a variety of types of decentralisation (political, 
administrative, and fiscal, for example) have been the subject of debate across a range of 
polities and supra-national political economies for several decades. However, the question of 
how finance might best follow function – and the attendant oversight of this process – is less 
resolved. Against the backdrop of reforms to municipal finance in Australia, this paper 
provides an account of the formation and functioning of the Local Government Finance 
Authority of South Australia (LGFA) the New Zealand Local Government Funding Agency 
(NZLGFA) and the Municipal Finance Authority of British Colombia (MFABC). The case 
studies suggest that own-source sub-national finance can be augmented through the use of 
such instruments for the deployment of ‘good capital’. The broader introduction of such 
financial instruments is also considered. 
 
Keywords: Municipal bond banks, municipal debt, municipal finance, municipal bond 
banks; White Paper on Reform of the Federation. 
Introduction 
Scholars of local government are adept at representing the putative benefits of decentralised 
systems of political economy, wherein advantages are accrued based upon ‘finance’ 
following ‘function’ (Fenna 2007; Robotti and Dollery 2009). However, in many 
jurisdictions public policies designed to pursue these theoretical advantages can be the source 
of significant debate (Shah and Shah 2006). Arguably, this is the case in the contemporary 
Australian context. Against a history of the increasing fiscal dominance of federal 
government (Philimore 2013) we examine what might be described as the ‘mood for change’ 
represented in the Abbott Government’s announcement of the ‘White Paper on the Reform of 
the Federation’ (PM 2014) and the potential contribution that instruments of sub-national 
finance, specifically municipal bond banks, could make to a more decentralised fiscal 
landscape. 
Our discussion here proceeds from an examination of the ‘Terms of Reference’ (‘ToRs’) of 
the White Paper on the Reform of the Federation and a brief account of contemporary 
municipal finance in Australia. Following this, drawing on the work of Dollery, Kortt and 
Grant (2013) we examine the workings of three sub-national municipal bond banks, the Local 
Government Finance Authority of South Australia (LGFA), the New Zealand Local 
Government Funding Agency (NZLGFA) and the Municipal Finance Authority of British 
Colombia (MFABC). We argue that these institutions provide examples of subnational 
finance pointing to a direction for decentralising reforms; also to a form of social democratic 
capitalisation that prima facie avoids being grounded in merely the motive for financial gains. 
Municipal finance in Australia 
Despite being consistently described as the ‘poor cousin’ of Australia’s three-tier federal 
system of government (see, for example, Aulich 2005) Australian local government is a 
significant element of the nation-state’s political economy. For example, it employs 
approximately 145,000 people; it has an infrastructure value of $106.3 billion and collects 
$6.4 billion in rates annually (ALGA 2014a). Local government finance in Australia has 
several main features. First, notwithstanding the high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance that 
characterises the federation, in aggregate Australia’s 562 local governments are largely self-
funded, with own-source revenue comprising on average 83 per cent of all income and grants 
from state and federal governments comprising approximately nine percent of revenue 
(LGNR 2013: 12). Second, state-based Local Government Grants Commissions (LGGCs) 
award federally-supplied grants to individual municipalities according to principles of inter-





have been awarded residual authority beyond ultra-varies in the last two decades, compared 
with its international counterparts in many settings the activities of the sector are heavily 
(although variably) monitored and constrained (Grant and Dollery 2012; Dollery, O’Keefe 
and Crase 2009). Fourth, local governments have been subject to acts of financial largesse by 
federal government. Historically Labor governments have awarded monies framed by policy 
considerations of nation-building, equity and regional economic prosperity. Alternatively, 
conservative governments have channelled monies for the purposes of maintaining road and 
road stock (Kelly, Dollery and Grant 2009; ALGA 2014b). Fifth, despite some observations 
to the contrary (see, for example, PC 2014: 2) Australian local government is consistently 
viewed as not having the fiscal capacity to renew the large stock of infrastructure – 
particularly transport infrastructure – that falls under its purview (Dollery et al 2013). Finally 
and perhaps ironically, notwithstanding the great diversity across the Australian local 
government sector, municipalities generally carry ‘extraordinarily low levels of debt relative 
to the security [of] their income base and the nature of [their] responsibilities’ (Comrie 2013: 
i). This is so much the case that ‘on average, councils have more money in the bank than they 
have debt’ (Comrie 2013: i). 
Reform context: White Paper on the Reform of the Federation  
It is against this backdrop that the Abbott Government’s initiation of two White Papers, the 
‘White Paper on the Reform of the Federation’ and the ‘White Paper on Reform of 
Australia’s Taxation System’ were announced in June 2014 (PM 2014). At the time of 
writing, the ToRs for the ‘White Paper on Reform of Australia’s Taxation System’ were yet 
to be released. However, a brief consideration of the ToRs of the White Paper on Reform of 
the Federation in this context is instructive. In particular, it serves to link our consideration of 
the arguments for decentralisation mentioned in the introduction with the examination of 
municipal financial instruments that follows. 
For the most part the ToRs adopt a tone of what might be described as ‘economistic 
administrative neutrality’. For example, the objectives of ‘efficiency’, ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘accountability’ are initially identified with inter alia several aims: ‘to reduce and end, as far 
as possible, the waste duplication and second-guessing between different levels of 
government’; ‘to achieve a more efficient and effective federation, and in so doing, improve 
national productivity; and to ‘ensure our federal system … is better understood and valued by 
Australians’, ‘has clearer allocation of roles and responsibilities’; ‘enhances governments’ 
autonomy, flexibility and efficiency and political accountability and supports Australia’s 
economic growth and international competitiveness’ (PM 2014). 
However, these goals are combined with statements representative of the idea that ‘finance 
should follow function’. For example: ‘The White Paper will seek to clarify roles and 
responsibilities to ensure that, as far as possible, the States and Territories are sovereign in 
their own sphere (PM 2014; emphasis added). Further, under ‘Issues to be considered’, the 
ToRs inter alia state: ‘[C]onsideration will be given to: ‘the practicalities of limiting 
Commonwealth policies and funding to core national interest matters’; ‘reducing or, if 
appropriate, eliminating overlap between Local, State and Commonwealth responsibility’ and 
‘achieving agreement between State and Commonwealth governments about their distinct 
and mutually exclusive responsibilities and subsequent funding sources for associated 
programmes’. The ToRs  recognise a role for overlapping responsibilities between 
jurisdictions (for example, one of the aims of the White Paper is to ‘achie[ve] equity and 
sustainability in the funding of any programmes that are deemed to be the responsibility of 
more than one level of government’). However, arguably this is more of a concession to the 
idea of jurisdictional integrity than an endorsement of ‘cooperative federalism’ (see, for 
example, Head 2006; Phillimore 2013). Moreover, ‘subsidiarity’, defined as ‘where 





to improving outcomes’ is listed alongside other values (‘equity, efficiency and effectiveness 
of service delivery’; ‘accountability for performance in delivering outcomes’; ‘fiscal 
sustainability’) that are to inform the drafting of the White Paper. Additionally, while the 
ToRs state that consideration must be given to horizontal fiscal equalisation on equity 
grounds, it is also asserted that any reforms ‘needs to be implemented in a way that avoids 
creating disincentives for [States] to improve their own revenue generation or to make the 
reforms necessary to improve the operation of their economies’ (PM 2014). 
On this interpretation, the White Paper presents the possibility of radical reform, if not the 
probability of this eventuating. In particular, the endorsement of the ‘value’ of subsidiarity in 
the ToRs can be described as ‘unfriendly’ to extended power of the Commonwealth, but ‘not 
unfriendly’ to possibilities for increased responsibilities and authority of both state 
governments and potentially local governments: The ToRs suggest that the issue of ‘finance 
following function’ ought to be grasped in the forthcoming White Paper. 
Understood as described above, the discussion of subsidiarity and sub-national sovereignty is 
overwhelmingly concerned with reforming the relationship between the Commonwealth and 
its constituent states in Australia’s federation. Framed as such, local and regional structures 
of government and governance form a relatively minor area of interest in the sense that they 
can legitimately be viewed as mere creatures of state government statute, rather than the well-
springs of a thriving democratic polity. Further, these alternative views, wherein local 
government is conceptualised as either a merely the efficient provider of services, or the 
foundation of democratic participation, represent not merely different ideological positions 
concerning the role of government in Australia’s political economy, but also important 
elements of Australia’s party-political history (see, for example, Kelly, Dollery and Grant 
2009). However, arguably, encouraging the development of municipal bond banking in the 
Australian context comprises a possible option for ‘finance following function’ and thereby, 
if cogently argued and ethically defensible, a means to move beyond the party-political nature 
of local government in Australia’s political history. The next section of the paper provides an 
‘ideal-type’ account of the functioning of municipal bond banking and examines the 
functioning of t such extant institutions. 
Municipal bond banks 
Dollery et al (2013: 231-2) defined a municipal bond bank as: ‘an entity that sells its own 
securities and relends bond proceeds to local government entities’. It is important to note that 
this generic definition can include public institutions, for-profit firms or non-profit 
organisations, as is the case in the United States (see, for example, Mysac 2012). However, 
securities issued by municipal bond banks nonetheless rely upon the same fundamental asset 
for securitisation, namely a tax base. Further, while municipal bond banks can issue bonds for 
a variety of reasons, such as the financing of infrastructure, the issuance of long-term bond 
pools for the purpose of refinancing existing debt is common (Dollery et al 2013: 234).  
The rudimentary mechanics of bond banks are conceptually simple; this is one element of 
their appeal. Drawing on the fact that local governments are legislatively empowered to tax 
(in particular, land) a financial institution – a bond bank – can be legally created. This bond 
bank then issues bonds for sale (i.e.: offering a return of interest paid over a specified time 
period of maturation) in a variety of markets: For example, municipal bonds can be issued on 
the ‘open market’ – where they compete against a range of other investment products (shares; 
bonds offered by other governments, for example). Alternatively municipal bonds can be 
offered for sale to select clients; in some cases (as we shall see) only municipalities 
themselves.  
The bond bank then uses the cash acquired through the sale of bonds to acquire debt 
obligations from participating councils and in some cases other legal entities. In this sense 





be defined as a ‘chain good’ in economic theory (McNutt 1994), and can also be classified as 
a ‘shared service’ (see, for example, Dollery, Grant and Kortt 2012). Loans to participating 
entities are then repaid to the bond bank according to an agreed upon schedule and these 
monies in turn are used to repay investors. Security for the bonds is reinforced by the fact that 
in most instances municipalities are borrowers from a particular municipal bond bank, and as 
such their tax bases all form an element to the underlying solvency of the bank. In many 
instances sovereign governments guarantee the bonds. This high level of security affects the 
yield able to be offered by the bonds, low risk resulting in low yield. However, an advantage 
is that the price of finance to participating entities – the interest on loans made to local 
governments – can be kept below commercial rates.  
This simple account of the operation of municipal bond banks by no means implies that these 
types of financial institutions are immune from failure or, indeed, immune from sophistry, in 
the sense, for example, that many financial institutions and specific credit instruments have 
been in recent memory, particularly in association with the Global Financial Crisis (see, for 
example, McKibbin and Stoeckel 2010). Nor does it account for additional theoretical 
advantages and disadvantages of these institutions (Dollery et al 2013: 233-236). In fact, 
scholarship concerned with both the theory and operation of municipal bonds is expansive, 
particularly in the United States where in 2012 the ‘mini-bond’ market comprised $3.7 
trillion (Doty 2012 xiv; see also Feldstein and Fabozzi 2008; O’Hara 2012; Johnson, Martin 
and Moldogaziev 2014). However, rather than engage in a general description of municipal 
bonds we provide an account of three extant municipal bond banks as illustrative examples of 
the type of diversity that can characterise these institutions. These examples have been drawn 
from Dollery et al (2013) but have been updated and contextualised for our discussion here. 
The Local Government Finance Authority of South Australia 
The first illustrative example is the Local Government Finance Authority of South Australia 
(LGFA). The LGFA was established in January 1984 under the Local Government Finance 
Authority Act 1983. The Authority is a statutory corporation of the South Australian 
Government, operating under the Public Corporations Act 1993 (Dollery et al 2013: 239-
240). All local councils in South Australia are automatically members, although the use of 
LGFA by those councils for investment and loans purposes is entirely voluntary – in other 
words they can choose to source funds from commercial banks. Nevertheless, in 2012/2013, 
every council in South Australia had transacted business with LGFA (LGFA 2013: 5). In 
accordance with the Local Government Finance Authority Act 1983, all liabilities are 
guaranteed by the Treasurer of South Australia (LGFA 2013: 12). The LGFA is overseen by 
a seven-member Board of Trustees derived from state and local government, all of whom 
serve for two years. 
In concert with the general description of municipal bond banks offered above, the functions 
of LGFA are to develop and implement a borrowing and investment program for the benefit 
of councils and prescribed local government bodies, and to engage in other financial activities 
as determined by the Minister for Local Government in consultation with the South 
Australian Local Government Association (Auditor-General 2013: 965). The LGFA utilises a 
number of financial instruments, including loans and held-to-maturity financial assets (i.e.: 
bonds), which can be disposed of in an existing market if required (Auditor-General 2013: 
966). In essence, the LGFA operates as a bank, the exclusive clients of which are South 
Australian local authorities and Prescribed Local Government Bodies to whom it offers funds 
on flexible terms. The LGFA offers fixed-rate and floating-rate types of loans, and several 
types of secure investments, namely ‘at call deposits’, ‘short term deposits’ ranging from 30 






The LGFA is a modest financial institution. In the financial year 2012/2013 it generated a 
profit of $4.350 million before tax (LGFA 2013: 5). Based on an audit carried out by the 
South Australian Auditor-General for the year ended 30 June 2012, the Statement of 
Financial Position showed net assets of $55.5 million; net loans and advances to customers 
increased by $50.9 million; and deposits from customers increased by $37.6 million (South 
Australian Auditor-General 2013: 961). As of March 2014, the LGFA was able to ‘celebrate 
30 years of success’ (LGFA 2014).  
In the Australian context there is debate over the ‘suboptimal use of debt finance within local 
government and speculation that this is contributing to an under-provision of infrastructure by 
the sector’ (see, for example, Ernst and Young 2013: 1). There have been calls for the 
establishment of a national collective financing vehicle for the local government sector that 
could address this suboptimal use of debt (Dollery, et al 2013). Were such a body to come 
into being, there would be likely implications for the ongoing functioning of the LGFA in 
South Australia. 
New Zealand Local Government Funding Agency 
The New Zealand Local Government Funding Agency Ltd (NZLGFA) was enabled under the 
Local Government Borrowing Act 2011 and was incorporated on 1 December 2011 (New 
Zealand Local Government Funding Agency 2011). The NZLGFA is a ‘Council Controlled 
Organisation’ (CCO) operating under the Local Government Act 2002, and is owned by 30 
Local Authority Councils and the Crown. LGFA operates on the basis of the primary 
objective of ‘optimising the debt funding terms and conditions for participating locals 
authorities’ (NZLGFA 2014a: 6). It does so by providing the New Zealand local governments 
with: 
• estimated savings in annual interest costs; 
• longer-term borrowings; and 
• greater certainty of access to debt market, subject to them operating in accordance 
with sound business practice (NZLGFA 2014a: 6) 
 
Similar to the South Australian LGFA, the NZLGFA conforms to the Dollery, Grant and 
Kortt (2012) definition of a ‘vertical shared service’. It issues bonds on the open market 
which are secured by the capital value of New Zealand local government and from which 
member councils can then draw upon for funding purposes. In other words, the NZLGFA 
provides access to a potentially far larger source of funds, provided that investors find the 
bonds attractive in terms of both security and rate of return (Dollery et al 2013).  
The NZLGFA has a Board of Directors which is responsible for the strategic direction and 
control of the organisation’s activities (NZLGFA 2014b: 5). The Board comprises between 
four and seven directors, with a majority of independent directors who are required to comply 
with a formal Charter, meet on a regular basis (no less than six times a year) and adhere to a 
‘no surprises approach’ in its dealings with its shareholders (NZLGFA 2014b: 5-7). This 
includes providing shareholders with an Annual Report (including a ‘Directors’ Report’, a 
‘Financial Statement’ and an ‘Auditor’s Report’), a ‘Half Yearly Report’, providing the 
Director’s commentary on operations for the relevant six month period, and a ‘Statement of 
Intent’ are delivered to Shareholders on or before 30 June each year. All of these documents 
are made available to the public on the organisation’s website. 
The NZLGFA issued its inaugural bonds on 15 February 2012. Local demand was expected 
from institutional fund managers, retail investors and financial institutions. Demand was also 
expected from global investors on the basis that the bonds would be tax free to offshore 
investors (NAB 2012). By March 2012 all of NZLGFA debt issues had been fully subscribed, 
in every case investors having sought many more bonds than the offered volume (Dollery et 





borrower after the central Government’ (National Australia Bank 2012: 1). The net operating 
profit for the half-year ended 31 December 2013 was $3.27 million, which was $0.09 million 
ahead of the forecast in the ‘Statement of Intent’. LGFA has strong credit fundamentals: Both 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch rated the securities AA+ for the local currency and AA for 
foreign currency, the same as the New Zealand sovereign ratings (NZLGFA 2014a: 3). In its 
credit rating for the NZLGFA, Standard and Poor’s (2011) noted that its strengths included, 
first, an ‘extremely high’ likelihood of extraordinary support from the New Zealand 
government and second its single-purpose focus in lending to the country’s local government 
sector. Nevertheless, one weakness identified was a modest earnings capacity, reflecting the 
Agency’s low-risk and not-for-profit role. The organisation was also described as similar to 
municipal funding agencies in countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Japan, all of 
which supply low-cost funding to their respective local government sectors (Standard and 
Poor’s 2011: 3). The NZLGFA operates under favourable policy conditions in the sense that 
the Local Government Act 2002 [New Zealand] as amended in 2013, recognises ‘the crucial 
role local government plays in developing, attracting and retaining local economic activity to 
create business friendly environments’. This includes investing over $8 billion in 
infrastructure and services annually to enable businesses to operate effectively (Local 
Government New Zealand 2014). 
The Municipal Finance Authority of British Columbia 
The Municipal Finance Authority of British Columbia (MFABC) is a somewhat more 
complex institution. It was established in 1970 under the Municipal Finance Authority Act to 
provide ‘long-term and short-term financing for regional districts and their members 
municipalities, regional hospital districts and other prescribed institutions in British Columbia 
(BC)’ (MFABC 2013: 8). The implementation of the Authority was grounded in the logic of 
accruing economies of scope and scale for all municipalities in the Province, yet its formal 
establishment was a vexatious issue at the time, with opponents arguing that borrowings of 
individual municipalities should be underwritten by the Province itself. This opposition was 
circumvented by local governments within each regional district being joint and severally 
liable for each other’s long-term debt borrowings through the Authority – in essence the ‘tax 
base’ for the authority was at the time of inception and remains a theoretical one residing at 
the district level as opposed to local or provincial or local level (Bryant 2011: 1).  
As of 2013, the Authority was governed by 39 members appointed from each of the 28 
regional districts within the province. The members meet twice a year and approve 
appointments to a ten-member Board of Trustees, which exercises executive and 
administrative powers and duties, including policy, strategy and business plans (MFABC 
2014). Since its founding, the Authority has focused on providing long-term capital financing 
for its clients for periods of five to 30 years (MFABC 2014). The range of financial services 
was expanded in the early 1990s by the inclusion of short-term investment opportunities (up 
to a maximum of five years), interim financing (bridge funding in advance of revenue 
collections of for those awaiting long-term borrowing); and leasing (floating rate financing of 
capital leases for terms up to five years). The Authority also facilitates access to its clients for 
pooled investments (fixed income mutual funds offering investing opportunity for operating 
cash or surplus funds) managed by a professional investment firm. It also operates a 
‘Municipal Investment Plan’, which is a portal for municipal employees and elected officials 
to access self-directed investment opportunities at reduced management fees (MFABC 2014). 
The Municipal Finance Authority Act also requires the establishment of a ‘Debt Reserve 
Fund’, which accumulates by withholding one per cent of principal amounts of each loan 
request. Under the provision of the Act, the Authority has unfettered access to the full 
property assessment base in the province without requiring approval of any senior level of 





be recovered under the terms of the loan agreements with the regional district, the Trustees 
may impose a tax on British Columbia taxable land and improvements to restore the fund. 
The loan agreements stipulate that the Authority will invoice clients for principal payments 
and interest charged at the regional district level. The regional districts are then responsible 
for the collection of funds subsequently lent to member municipalities. The loan repayment 
process follows a ‘sinking fund’ methodology in which clients repay principal amounts in 
equal annual instalments. Funds received are invested by the Authority and held as an offset 
against the associated source of financing, which is typically accomplished through providing 
clients with budget certainly (a fixed loan repayment stream), while eliminating the 
requirement for ‘balloon payment’s at loan expiry (MFABC 2013: 11). 
The Authority has been described as ‘a good example of the mutual guarantee model’ of 
financing for local governments (Ernst and Young 2013: 4). Unlike the LGFA in South 
Australia, it issues bonds on the open market and as thus has access to a far greater quantum 
of funds. The transactions of the Authority are not guaranteed by government, which again is 
different from the LGFA. It is nevertheless a ‘vertical shared service’ – as defined by Dollery 
et al. (2012) – due to the fact that the equity for the Authority resides in the taxing power of 
British Columbia’s Regional Districts that were created in 1968, and not in the municipalities 
themselves. Its modus operandi is grounded in operations other than profit maximisation, 
especially in providing a source of credit to local government authorities and other entities. 
The secure nature of the Authority, grounded in the taxation capacity of the regional district 
system, sees it enjoying the highest possible credit rating. As a consequence, it is able to 
borrow at extremely low rates, to offer loans to its constituent members at extremely 
competitive rates, and to develop a range of additional financial instruments, including 
Pooled Investment Funds and a vehicle for local authorities to invest excess funds. While it is 
obliged to offer low yields on deposits, these deposits are nonetheless regarded as very secure 
(Dollery et al. 2013: 254). 
Observations 
Having set out the salient characteristics of local government finance in Australia, we have 
noted that the system is characterised by high degrees of own-source funding alongside a 
high degree of VFI – although the imbalance is between state and federal government. 
Further, the system of public administration is grappling with the issue of sub-national 
finance: The ‘White Paper on the Federation’ may not amount to structural reform of finance; 
alternatively it may entail reinforcement of state fiscal authority. In this context municipal 
bond banks provide one course of public policy, particularly to buttress own-source revenue 
beyond its already high levels.  
There have been some recent indications that institutions of this type are being developed in 
jurisdictions other than South Australia. At the time of writing the Municipal Association of 
Victoria (MAV) was poised to establish a pooled borrowing vehicle for councils, bonds for 
which will be issued as secure obligations of the MAV in a similar way that they are issued 
by the LGFA and the MFABC. On October 9 Moody’s Investor Services assigned an Aa2 
issuer rating to the LGFV, stating: ‘The very high credit quality of the participating councils 
and the mature and supportive institutional framework under which they operate support the 
ratings’ (Moody’s 2014). Similarly, the NSW Government’s response to the Independent 
Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP) has agreed with a recommendation that the 
statutory finance authority of that state, Treasury Corporation, develop a low-cost borrowing 
facility for local government bodies in that jurisdiction – although the eventual shape of this 
facility is still unclear (NSW Government 2014: 5). However (arguably) these new financial 
instruments ought not to be viewed as being capable of replacing extant grants from the 





As we have already noted in this paper, the theoretical simplicity of ‘ideal-type’ municipal 
bond banks ought not to lead us into assuming that they are immune from institutional 
sophistry. This potential problem is noteworthy, for while sub-national debt is not prima facie 
sovereign debt this does not militate against the requirement for careful design, maintenance 
and oversight of institutions by higher tiers of government. Nevertheless, conceivably 
municipal bond banks could be used to assist with the financial requirements of groups of 
smaller local governments and for serving local demand for investments. 
That ‘the devil is in the detail’ of the design of particular institutions and regimes of oversight 
is our final point in this brief discussion. Perhaps most intriguingly, further research would 
appear to be required to combine studies in public administration, political economy and 
financial economics is a bid to satisfy investigating options for ‘finance following function’ 
in the context of decentralisation. More importantly, it would be remiss for those scholars 
with a declared interest in political economy not to pass a keen eye over the development of 
such financial instruments, rather than leave their design and potential proliferation to those 







ALGA [Australian Local Government Association]. (2014a) ‘Home’. Available: 
http://alga.asn.au/?ID=59&Menu=41,83 [accessed 17 November 2014]. 
ALGA [Australian Local Government Association]. (2014b) Financial Assistance Grants 
payments. Available: http://alga.asn.au/?ID=12528 [accessed 18 August 2014]. 
Aulich, C. (2005) ‘Australia: Still a tale of Cinderella?’ Denters, B. and Rose, L. E. (eds), 
Comparing Local Governance – Trends and Developments. Palgrave Macmillan: 
London. 
Bryant, R.T. (2011) ‘40 years of history: Municipal Finance Authority of British Columbia’, 
from the 2010 Annual Report of the Municipal Finance Authority of British 
Columbia. Available: http://mfa.bc.ca/pdfs/MFA201 [accessed August 2014]. 
Comrie, J. (2013) ‘Debt is not a dirty word: The role and use of debt in local government’. 
Report prepared for Australian Centre for Excellence in Local Government 
(ACELG) and Institute of Public Works Engineering Australasia (IPWEA). 
Available: file:///C:/Users/119416/Downloads/ACELG_Role-Use-of-
Debt%20(1).pdf  [accessed 18 August]. 
Dollery, B. E., Grant, B. and Crase, L. (2010) ‘Not what they seem: An analysis of strategic 
service delivery partnerships in local government’, Australasian Canadian Studies, 
28(2), pp. 59-74. 
Dollery, B. E., O’Keefe, S. and Crase, L. (2010) ‘State 0versight models for Australian local 
government’, Economic Papers, 28(4), pp. 279-290. 
Dollery, B., Kortt, M. and Grant, B. (2013) Funding the Future: Financial sustainability and 
infrastructure finance in Australian local government. The Federation Press, Sydney. 
Dollery, B.E., Grant, B. and Kortt, M. (2012) Councils in Cooperation: Shared Services and 
Australian Local Government. The Federation Press, Sydney. 
Doty, R. (2012) Bloomberg Visual Guide to Municipal Bonds. Bloomberg Press, New Jersey. 
Ernst and Young. (2013) National financing authority for local government: Options 
assessment. Report prepared for the Department of Regional Australia, Local 
Government, Arts and Sport. Ernst and Young, Melbourne. 
Feldstein, S. G. and Fabozzi, F. J. (eds), (2008) The Handbook of Municipal Bonds. John 
Wiley & Sons, New Jersey. 
Grant, B. and Dollery, B. E. (2012) ‘Autonomy versus oversight in local government reform: 
The implications of “home rule” for Australian local government’. Australian 
Journal of Political Science 47(3), pp. 99-214. 
Head, B. (2006) ‘Taking subsidiarity seriously: What role for the states?’ in Brown, A. J. and 
Bellamy, J. (eds), Federalism and regionalism in Australia: New approaches, New 
institutions? ANU E Press, Canberra, pp. 155-170.  
Johnson, C. L., Martin, J. L. and Moldogaziev, T. T. (2014) State and Local Financial 
Instruments: Policy Changes and Management, Edward Elgar Cheltenham. 
Kelly, A., Dollery, B. E. and Grant, B. (2009) ‘Regional development and local government: 
Three generations of federal government intervention’. Australasian Journal of 
Regional Studies 15(2), pp. 171-193.  
LGNR [Local Government National Report]. (2013) Local Government National Report. 
Available: http://regional.gov.au/local/publications/reports/index.aspx [accessed 3 
September 2014]. 
LGFA [Local Government Finance Authority of South Australia] (2013) Annual Report 
2013. LGFA, Adelaide.  
LGFA [Local Government Finance Authority of South Australia] (2014) LGFA Newsletter, 





Local Government New Zealand (2014) Business Friendly Councils: Guidelines and case 
studies from New Zealand’s Core Cities. Local Government New Zealand, 
Wellington. 
McKibbin, W. J. and Stoeckel, A. (2010) ‘The global financial crisis: Causes and 
consequences’, Asian Economic Papers 9(1) pp.54-86. 
McNutt, P. (1999) ‘Public goods and club goods’, in B. Bouckaert and G. de Geest, (eds), 
Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Moody’s Investor Service. (2014) ‘Moody's assigns Aa2 issuer rating to the local government 
funding vehicle set up by the Municipal Association of Victoria (Australia)’. 
Available: https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-assigns-Aa2-issuer-rating-to-
the-local-government-funding--PR_306575 [accessed 9 October 2014]. 
MFABC [Municipal Finance Authority of British Columbia]. (2013) Annual Report 2013. 
Municipal Finance Authority of British Columbia, Victoria. 
MFABC [Municipal Finance Authority of British Columbia]. (2014) ‘Who is the Municipal 
Finance Authority?’, Available: http://mfa.bc.ca [accessed August 2014]. 
Mysac, J. (2012) Encyclopaedia of Municipal Bonds: A Reference Guide to Market Events, 
Structures, Dynamics, and Investment Knowledge, John Wiley and Sons: New Jersey. 
NAB [National Australia Bank]. (2012) ‘Launching NZ Local Government Funding Agency 




New Zealand Government. (2011) Local Government Borrowing Act 2011, Public Act 2011 
No 77. Government of New Zealand, Wellington. 
NZLGFA [New Zealand Local Government Funding Agency] (2011) New Zealand Local 
Government Funding Agency, http://www.lgfa.co.nz/, [accessed August 2014]. 




.ashx, accessed August 2014. 





Standard and Poor’s. (2011) Ratings Direct: New Zealand Local Government Funding 
Agency Ltd. Global Credit Portal. Standard and Poor Financial Services, subsidiary 
of the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Melbourne. 
NSW Government. (2014) ‘Fit for the future: NSW Government response. Independent Local 
Government review Panel and Local Government Acts Taskforce 
recommendations’. Available: 
http://www.fitforthefuture.nsw.gov.au/sites/fftf/files/NSW-Government-Response-
Panel-and-Taskforce-recommendations.pdf [accessed 8 October 2014]. 
O’Hara, N. (2012) The Fundamentals of Municipal Bonds (6th ed). Securities Industry and  
PC [Productivity Commission]. (2014) Public infrastructure. Productivity Commission 
Inquiry Report Volume 1, Available: 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/137280/infrastructure-





PM [Prime Minister of Australia. The Hon. Tony Abbott MP]. (2014) ‘White Paper on the 
reform of the federation’ Available: https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-06-
28/white-paper-reform-federation [accessed 18 August]. 
Robotti, L. and Dollery, B. E. (2009) ‘Structural reform, revenue adequacy and optimal tax 
assignment in local government’, Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance, 3, 
pp.52-67. 
Shah, A. and Shah, S. (2006) ‘The new vision of local governance and the evolving roles of 
local government’ in Shah, A. (ed), Local Governance in Developing Countries. The 
World Bank: Washington. 
South Australian Auditor-General. (2013) ‘Audit of the Local Government Finance Authority 
of South Australia’ Available: http://www.audit.sa.gov.au/publications/10-
11/b/b2/Local%20Government%20Finance%20Authority%20of%20South%20Austr
alia.pdf [accessed August 2014]. 
Standard and Poor’s. (2011) Ratings Direct: New Zealand Local Government Funding 
Agency Ltd. Global Credit Portal. Standard and Poor Financial Services, subsidiary 
of the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Melbourne. 
 
